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Taft Papers on the League of Nations. Edited by Theodore Marburg 
and
Horace E. Flack. New York, The Macmillan Co., ig2o. pp. xx, 34o.
Former President Taft, through his speeches, letters, and published 
articles,
collected here, rendered a peculiar service in crystallizing public sentiment 
on
the League of Nations. This was all the greater because he did not speak 
from
a partisan standpoint and because he did 'his part in endeavoring to keep 
the
great question away from political controversies. Even one who cannot agree
with all his conclusions cannot fail to note that all .his labors were in the direction
of clarifying the new issue and bringing about a compromise of differences 
in
the interest of world-wide peace. For this purpose he labored in season and
out of season. His comments, his pleas, and his criticisms all tended to popular-
ize the great question and to bring it within the understanding of the masses of
the American people. That a final adjustment of the matter was not reached and
that no compromise of extreme differences was arrived at, was a great world
misfortune from which many countries are suffering at the present day.
Personally, I have thought that Mr. Taft's suggested reservation on Article X,
which I offered in the Senate as a compromise, was the best solution of the
differences arising over that article. It read as follows:
"The United States declines to assume any legal or binding obligation to pre-
serve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country under
the provisions of Article X or to employ the military or naval forces of the
United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose; but the Congress,
which under the Constitution has the sole power in the premises, will consider
and decide what moral obligation if any, under the circumstances of any particu-
lar case, when it arises, should move the United States in the interest of world
peace and justice to take action therein and will provide accordingly."
That reservation expresses what has later developed to be the attitude taken
by members of the existing League of Nations. If it could have been developed
by the Senate as a compromise measure it would have removed all reasonable
fears and paved the way ,for the United States to enter the League.
GILBERT M. HITcHcoCK
United States Senate.
Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence. Vol. L Introduction and Tribal La.
By Paul Vinogradoff. New York, Oxford University Press, 192o. pp. ix, 428.
Vinogradoff needs no introduction. For years he has stood at the top of his
profession, admired alike for his voluminous knowledge and his sound and
dexterous exposition. And now, in the ripeness of his powers, he undertakes
what he characterizes as a most complicated task.
"'In the course of my legal and historical studies one great problem has presented
itself over and over again-the problem of the relation between conditions and
efforts, between aims and fate. It is in the sphere of law that this problem
assumes its most definite aspect. Law, both customary and enacted, 'is intended
to be a direction of conduct, but its actual application is a compromise between
intentions and circumstances."
It is plain that, for the solution of this broad life-problem, historians and lawyers
ought to be in collaboration. But they are not.
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"Historians have not yet come to realize that private law may be more importantfor social development than constitutional arrangements. And as for lawyers,they often have to be content with the stereotyped statements of more or lessantiquated textbooks. There is nothing for it but to step into the breach in thehope of reopening the discussion."
When you have an author like Vinogradoff there is nothing for it but to lethim tell his own story, and the reviewer should aim in the main simply to abstract
that story in such manner as to suggest a full reading. The long Introduction
to the series whose first volume is before us contains salient contentions, to theestablishment of which all that follows is designed to contribute. The author
begins by considering the relation between law and the sciences. Logic isindispensable to the lawyer, but law breaks through any logical straitjacket andescapes. Materials are "instinct with vital problems and issues. Utility, public
interest, morality, justice, are constantly claiming their share in the thoughts ofthe lawyer, while logic provides him with a solid framework for his reasoning."Logic is, in brief, a means and not an end; a method and not the whole content.
These generalizations, and others throughout the book, 'have the advantage
of copious support -by cases; there is nothing a priori about them. Similarly inthe treatment of the relation of law and psychology, in which much is said ofcriminal law, the author quietly sets aside the phantasms that have hampered
straight thinking-for instance, "the formula of free %ill comes to mean insubstance that men do not follow impulses blindly, but are normally able to actin accordance with their reason and morality." "The calculus of happiness could
not be effected on anything like scientific principles even if we had made upour minds as to the unit of measurement." The author emerges into the
conclusion that
"all the varieties of moral restraint are originally either the outcome of instinctsuseful to the species, or the result of reflection and expejrience on the part ofsocial groups as to their aims and requirements. Such reflection and experiencecarried a step further by education and custom form a body of rules of conductentirely distinct from the aspirations of individual egoism and providing thenecessary- checks on the latter."
Such conclusions drive the students into the next stage of relationship between
law and other disciplines, namely, that between law and social science. Itgratifies the reviewer to note the opinion that "no analysis of social life based
on the consciousness of isolated individuals can be sound or productive ofpositive results." It is plain that Vinogradoff is not under the lure of "social
psychology," in which, too often,
"social creations, like language and religion, are approached with more valourthan discretion, and instead of a critical examination of data and of carefulinferences, we are treated either to sweeping assertions about instincts or to arestatement of facts gleaned from occasional linguistic, mythological, or folklore
studies."
The author seems-to have MacDougall in mind. The fact is, as is tersely butcompletely stated, that "social formations set up standards of their own andrequire for their scientific study peculiar methods in keeping with the subject
itself." Otherwise there would be no reason for a science of society. I amtempted to quote too copiously from this section, which seems to me replete withjustification of the views of those sociologists who seek to. practise scientific
methods. With a real science of society, as the author sufficiently indicates,
law should remain upon.the closest of terms. To such closeness of association
we are again referred at the end of a pregnant chapter on the relation between
law and political theory; "thus," says the author, "we are led again from political
doctrine to social science as a whole." There is nothing here about the revelationsof a speculative philosophy of the state, or system of ethics. The relation of
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state and law to the individual and his sphere of interests, rights, and duties,
and to the various groups in which human solidarity finds expression, "ought to
form the backbone of a general science of society, of the sociology discovered by
Comte and Spencer."
Part II of the Introduction covers Methods and Schools of Jurisprudence:
the Rationalists, Nationalists, and Evolutiofists; and those Modern Tendencies
in Jurisprudence for which there is as yet no collective name. Rationalistic
jurisprudence helps in analysis, but "does not solve the problems of the origin
*of legal rules and of their relation to the life of society." The Nationalists
"established once and for all the view of the organic growth of institutions
and rules"; but their teaching gave way before new methods. "Juridical
principles . . . are not merely logical categories, but forms for the concentration
of material rules, and rules change with conditions." (Ihering.) It was the
Darwinian principles of evolution that let in the light, here as elsewhere; "their
greatness and fruitfulness depend, of course, on the fact that they focus the
strivings and intuitions of a whole period of scientific thought."
"In the long history of civilization the first steps are in many respects the
most decisive. . . . These cultural origins supply us not only with simpler
combinations and more clearly defined natural conditions, but they possess the
inestimable advantage of presenting themselves in a very great number of
instances and varieties which shade off one into the other and offer welcome
opportunities for comparative investigation. This is so much the case, that
comparative jurisprudence has almost become synonymous with a study of
primitive societies."
And the work of the anthropological school has been supplemented by the socio-
logical, under the early apostleship of Comte and the powerful succession of
Ihering.
"The principles of law are bound to be social in their essence. Such principles
are bound to be broad and general, but they cannot be universal and eternal:
they appeal to the nature of man, not in the abstract, but as defined by circum-
stances." "Evolution in this domain means a constant struggle between two
conflicting tendencies-the certainty and stability of legal systems and progress
and adaptation to circumstances in order to achieve social justice."
The Introduction ends with this sentence: "The essential point is to recognize
the value of historical types as the foundation of a theory of law." Then
follows the first exhibit of cases (Tribal Law), completing this volume, but
to be succeeded shortly by a volume on the Jurisprudence of the Greek city,
and, later, by other instalments'as yet unnamed. The reviewer- will not extend
attention to the section on Tribal Law except to say that it covers, in tfhree parts,
and with rare learning and power, the.Elements of the Family, Aryan Culture,
and the Clan and the Tribe. The treatment is highly technical in parts and
covers primitive European mores with especial authority; but all ethnographical
cases are chosen with scrupulous- care from recognized authorities, and are
typical.
We have before us a great book and the forerunner of what cannot but be a
great series. This is what a scholar of ripe wisdom is privileged to do, and
ought to do, after his years of study and reflection: tell us what it all seems to
come to; show us on what lines we should push forward. To do this requires
qualities of mind and spirit that are exceptional-but our author has these.
Because such qualities are rare, and because less emancipated souls, with all
their patient industry, cannot rise to perspectives, books of this order are few.
They are the more welcome.
To the positions taken by this author certain sections of the profession will
adjust only with effort. Those who think that law is an annex of logic or
psychology or philosophy; or that it is a revelation on Tables of stone or bronze;
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or that it is immutable, and so immune from evolutionary change-such parties
will have considerable adjustment to make before they can see eye to eye with our.
author. But to those who are familiar with and have come to adhere to the
Sumnerian conception of the mores and their evolution, there is here only a
powerful though independent authority (for Vinogradoff does not know Sumner,
though Sumner knew Vinogradoff well) for the position, in particular with
respect to the nature of law, which they already occupy.
A. G. KEzLia
Yale University.
A Digest of the Law of Partnership. By Sir Frederick Pollock. Eleventh
Edition. London, Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 192o. pp. xxiv, 267.
This is the first edition in five years of the standard commentary on the English
Partnership Act of i8go. There are only a few changes from the preceding
edition, probably because the war seriously affected the kind of businesses which
are carried on in the partnership form and served as a check on litigation. The
most interesting new portions relate to the effect of the war upon partnerships.
The discussion of this matter under section 34 of the Act -has been changed some-
what, and two important decisions in -the House of Lords have been added. It is
regrettable that the book does not contain a longer discussion of these tw- cases
because of their interest in connection with American litigation. Rodriguez v.
Speyer' held that a partnership containing some English members and some
German members could sue in the English Courts during the war -to recover a
debt. This case gives considerable support to the entity theory, although it can
be explained otherwise on the ground that the prohibition of suit by an alien
enemy is not to be rigidly enforced to the injury of citizens. It is significant that
the New York courts in Rothbarth v. Herafeld have suspended the right of
action of a firm containing some alien enemies although the beneficial interest
of the suit was in New York banks. It will be interesting to see whether the
House of Lords view, or the New York view, wins approval in future discussions
of international law. Another very liberal decision of the House of Lords is
Stevenson v. Cartonnagen-Industrie. A firm was dissolved by the outbreak of
the war, inasmuch as some of the partners were Germans. The Court of Appeal
held that the English partners could take all the assets of the firm and continue the
business, keeping the profits for themselves. The only claim of the German part-
ners would be for the value of their share of the business in 1914. The House
of Lords reversed this decision and held that the German partners could claim a
share in the profits which were realized during the war from their share of the
assets, allowance being made for the fact that the only partners who rendered
personal service were the English. Of course, the Germans' share had to be paid
to the Alien Property Custodian for disposition after the war. Another decision,
Rex v. Kupfer,' rejects the suggestion of Griswold v. Waddington5 that a part-
nership between enemies is only suspended during the war. It is held to come to
an end.
A further effect of the war is that while simple interest at 5% was formerly
charged against the partners who continued business with the firm assets after
dissolution, the editor observes "the rate might be higher now [ig2o]" (p. 141,
notes.)
The other additions are a reference to the Registration of Business Names Act,
" [1919] A. C. 59.
2 (917) 179 .App. Div. 865, 167 N. Y. Supp. i99; (i9i8) 223 N, Y. 578, 119
N. E. 1075.
1 [x18] A. C. 239. '[i915] 2 K. B. 321, 338.'(i818, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 15 Johns, 57; x6 id: 43&
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1916 (PP. 25, 6); mention of Goldfarb v. Bartlett' (pp. 63, 64, 65, 111), which
holds that notice of dishonor to a continuing partner is also notice to the retiring
partner, but that an extension of time on a firm bill made before the retirement
discharges the retiring partner, inasmuch as he is now considered in the position
of a surety; and references to three less important cases7 (pp. 76, 78, ixi note).
This new edition of Pollock has especial value for American readers because
the Uniform Partnership Act has recently been adopted by several of the most
important commercial states. Many sections of the English statute have suf-
ficient resemblance to our own to render Pollock's citations and discussions help-
ful to the American practitioner. It is to be hoped that we shall soon have an
annotated edition of the Uniform Partnership Act similar to Brannan's Negotiable
Instruments Law. Under each section of our act might be placed the American
cases construing it, -the corresponding section of the English Act with the Eng-
lish cases and perhaps mention of the comments of Pollock and other English
writers, and finally, an abstract of the discussion of this particular, American sec-
tion by Dean Lewis and Professor Crane in their recent articles!
It is impossible to read over the English and American partnership statutes
without experiencing once more the keenest regret that the draftsmen deliberately
chose to disregard the usage of business men. It is a serious step backward to ask
our legislatures to deny the distinction between the firm and the partners just
as the courts were gradually beginning to take the business point of view. Con-
sider, for example, section 17 of the Uniform Partnership Act:
"Sec. x7. Liability of Incoming Partner. A person admitted as a partner into
an 6kisting partnership is liable for all the obligations of the partnership arising
before his admission as though he had been a partner when such obligations
were incurred, except that this liability shall be satisfied only out of partnership
property."
The business principle is that the incoming partner is not liable. The English Act,
section 17 (1), so states. The American act, because of its hostility to the entity
view, commits the absurdity of saying that he is liable and then showing that he is
not. The English Act also avoids the unfortunate language of section 25 of the
American statute, .thaf a partner is co-owner of specific partnership property as
tenant in partnership. The business view that the property and obligations are
those of the firm would reach -the same practical results as those stated in section
25 as the incidents of the partner's "tenancy," and will also reach a sound result
in situations not expressly coyered by this section, in which the underlying theory
of the American statute would defeat business understanding. On the other
hand, the Uniform Act has at .least two great advantages-partnership land is
treated as personalty, and the separate creditor of a partner, instead of levying
upon the partnership assets, acquires simply a charging lien. Both these provisions
are in accordance with the English statute, and the English decisions will be
of especial value on these important topics.
Z. CHAFEE, JR.
Law School of Harvard University.
The Debates in the Federal Convention of x787 which Framed the Constitution
of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison. Edited by
Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, for the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. New York, Oxford University Press, 1920. pp. xcvii, 73r.
No student of American constitutional history needs now to be told of the
[592o] i K. B. 639.
'Pearce v. Bulteel [1916] 2 -Ch. 544, ,556; Peake v. Carter [1916] 1 K. B. 652;
Dickson v. National Bank of Scotland [1917, H. L.] S. C. 5o.
' (x915) 24 YALE LA-w JOURNAL, 617; (1911) 6o U. P. L. Rnv. 93; (1915) 28
HARv. L. REV. 762; (1915-6) 29 id. x58, 291, 838.
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unique value of Madison's full and careful record of the debates and proceedings
of the Convention which framed our federal Constitution. The special value of
any particular reprint of that record depends upon the faithfulness and intelli-
gence with which Madison's manuscript is reproduced and upon the satisfactori-
ness of the physical make-up of the printed reproduction. The earlier editions of
the Debates were made, directly or indirectly, from a transcript of Madison's
manuscript. Although the transcript had been made under Madison's supervision,
the numerous vairiations between the transcript and the original make it a matter
of importance to have a satisfactory reprint made directly from the original
manuscript.
Since the discovery that the earlier texts were made from the transcript, and
prior to the publication of the volume in hand, three important editions of the
Debates have appeared. Two of these were made directly from thi original
manuscript; these are the text appearing in Volume III of the Documentary
History of the Constitution (published by the State Department in 1goo) and that
appearing in Volumes I and II of The Records of the Federal Convention of z787,
edited by Max Farrand (Yale University Press, 1911). The third of these later
texts is that appearing in Volumes III and IV of The Writings of Tames Madison,
edited by Gaillard Hunt (published in i9o2 by G. P. Putnani's Sons, the two
volumes containing the Debates being later, in i9o8, published separately) ; this
edition used the original manuscript only by taking a printed text made from the
transcript and then correcting that text by comparison with the -original manu-
script. None of these three editions has supplied the need for a reliable and
convenient edition of Madison's report. That of the 'Documentary History con-
tains a considerable number of errors and presents a confusing appearance
because of the forms in which it indicates the alterations and additions which
Madison made in his manuscript several decades after his first writing. The text
in the Farra nd volumes contains an entirely faithful record of the manuscript as
actually corrected by Madison and indicates Madison's alterations in simple and
satisfactory form; but as the Madison record is presented together with all other
records, split up and arranged chronologically by days, the Farrand text does not
provide-as, of course, it was not intended to provide-a handy edition of Madi-
son's report. The method followed in the Hunt reproduction did not result in
the elimination of all of the errors of the early printed edition which he used.
The volume under review appears to fulfill most of the requirements of a
satisfactory edition of Madison's Debates. The 'text is made from the original
manuscript as later corrected by Madison; and in foot-notes the variations in the
transcript from the original manuscript are noted. Exceptional precautions
appear to have been taken in order to escape all errors. The only criticism that
can be offered against the form of the text is that, in order to give it a perfectly
smooth appearance, all indications as to where Madison's later alterations appear,
are omitted; the manutcript as it finally left Madison's hands is followpd, with
nothing to show what parts remain as he wrote them originally at the time of
the Convention and what parts were changed or added by him in later years.
It would seem that every studious reader of the Debates is entitled to have con-
stantly clear to him what parts constitute a strictly contemporaneous record made
from the author's immediate observation, and what parts were added at a con-
siderably later period on the basis of notes and observations which the author
had through these later years garnered from the briefer records of other observ-
ers. The text as given in the Farrand volumes shows that this important infor-
mation can be supplied without any great sacrifice in the appearance of the text.
In additi6n to the Debdtes the volume under review contains other useful
materials. There is a brief introductory note by Mr. Scott on "The Federal
Convention in 1787 as an International Conference." Under "Antecedents to the,
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Federal Convention" there are presented, besides the usual documents, the Pro-
ceedings of the Annapolis Convention, credentials of the delegates to the Federal
Convention, and Major Pierce's character sketches of his fellow members. Fol-
lowing the Debates there are printed a few letters by Knox, Jay, Washington,
and Madison, relating to the need for constitutional revision, the Pinckney plan,
Hamilton's draft, Madison's later notes on his suffrage speech in the Convention,
and the records of state ratification. For the Debates, the table of contents,
arranged by days, appearing in -the Documentary History, is reproduced; and an
apparently adequate index is supplied. The volume is admirable in the appear-
ance of its text and general make-up. F. W. Coscas.
Ohio State University.
Safeguards of Liberty, or Liberty Protected; by Laws. By W. B. Swaney. New
York, Oxford University Press, i92o. pp. xviii, 2io.
Taking as his central theme the permanent contributions of -Thomas Jefferson
to American political thought, Judge Swaney discusses in an accurate and enter-
taining way the derivation of some of the underlying principles of our modem
democracy.
There is a Foreword by Mr. W. G. McAdoo. The book itself consists of four
chapters, each of which is a complete monograph, devoted to the Declaration of
Independence, to Jefferson's legislative reforms in Virginia, to his contribution
to the nation, and to a discussion of the growth and development of civil and
religious liberty.
The account of the, genesis of the Declaration of Independence is the most
valuable part of the work. The antecedents of the Declaration of Independence
are not nearly so well understood as those of the Constitution. Whenever it is
discussed in any terms other than those of meaningless panegyric, it is usually
considered as a theoretical and abstract statement of the rights of man, the
product of the mind of a single individual. Judge Swaney, however, although
he does not claim for Jefferson any originality of doctrine, does specifically point
out that, possessed of a literary power which few Americans have equaled,
Jefferson gave arf elegant forum to the principles of the most advanced English
political theories. His merit was in giving to already extant radical political
conceptions a trenchant and compelling statement. The practical aspect of the
document, as the party platform of a radical minority presenting their cause in
the best possible light, is not overlooked. The greatest service of the Declaration
was as most persuasive propaganda, which served the two-fold purpose of aiding
in turning a minority into a majority and of committing its supporters beyond
the possibility of compromise with the home government. That it so well served
its purpose is largely due to Jefferson.
Judge Swaney holds that next to the drafting of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, the most important work of Jefferson was done in liberalizing legisla-
tion in Virginia. He gives an excellent account of this work, especially of the
laws proposed by the committee of which Jefferson was chairman, including the
repeal of the law of entails, abrogation of the law of primogeniture, and the
establishment of religious freedom. The author also includes an accurate synop-
sis of the Virginia Bill of Rights, the significance and influence of which has not
been adequately recognized by historians. A single reading of this chapter can
not fail to convince one that the states have not taken advantage of the proffered
opportunities for progressive legislation. It is one of the defects of our dual
system that the federal government usually draws exclusively to itself the great
public-spirited men who otherwise might, like Jefferson, render invaluable service
to their home states.
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Of particular interest in the chapter dealing with Jefferson's contribution to
the nation is the emphasis put upon his consistent opposition to slavery. Judge
Swaney convincingly claims for Jefferson the credit for the inclusion in the
Ordinance of 1787 of the clause prohibiting slavery in the Northwest Territory.
Of equal interest is the comparison of Jefferson with John Marshall and the con-
trast between the statesmanship of Jefferson as shown by his executive acts, and
of Marshall as illustrated in his judicial opinions. Judge Swaney clearly and
succinctly presents a portrait of Chief Justice Marshall as he really was-a great
constructive statesman.
The last chapter describes the superstructure that has arisen upon the founda-
tions laid by Jefferson and in conclusion touches upon controversial subjects,
including the League of Nations.
Of the book as a whole it may be said that it presents in fresh and pleasing
form some of the fundamental charters of our state and national governments
to which as Americans we cannot too ofter recur.
WALTER P. ARmsTRoxG.
Memphis, Tenn.
A Selection of Cases on the Law of Domestic Relations and Persons. By Edwin
H. Woodruff. Third Edition. New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co., g9aom pp.
xviii, 753.
This is the third edition of a collection of cases on this subject, which from the
first has been a very good one. There has been no material change in the plan
of the book. Some of the cases which appeared in the former edition have been
displayed by others generally more recent and thought to be better adapted for
class room work. There is one appendix which shows the status of the common
law marriage in the United States and another which is a draft of an Act to
Make Uniform the Law Regulating Annulment of Marriage and Divorce.
Two features of the book require mention. Besides containing many more
cases, and these usually recent, the footnotes in the present edition contain
approximately 13o references to articles and critical comments which have
appeared in the leading law periodicals. To the reviewer this appears to be the
chief merit of the present edition and a sufficient justification for its preparation.
It is in striking contrast in this respect to all the casebooks on this subject which
have heretofore appeared. The value of such a copious reference to critical lit-
erature is obvious.
The present edition is 133 pages larger than its predecessor. It offers more
material than can possible be discussed adequately in class room exercises during
the period of time now usually allotted to a course on Peisons. As long, how-
ever, as we do not go to an unreasonable extent in requiring the student to pur-
chase cases which he will never find time to study, abundance of material is to be
desired. It gives the instructor the advantage of being able to choose those
cases which, in his hands, will yield the best results.
In the preparation of this book the cases have been selected with the purpose of
presenting the subjects, as nearly as is possible, in a compete and well-rounded
form. This has resulted in the inclusion of cases on such topics as Dower;
Curtesy; Wife's Separate Estate in Equity; Capacity of Married Women,
Infants, and Insane Persons to Contract and Commit Torts and Crimes; Juris-
diction in Divorce Cases; etc. These and other topics represent the points at
which the course in Domestic Relations and Persons, as this collection of cases
suggests that it be developed, overlaps other courses. Whether these topics can
be taught to the best advantage in this course or in the courses on Property, Con-
tracts, Torts, Criminal Law, Conflict of Laws, Trusts, or elsewhere, is a matter
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about which instructors disagree. But that the inclusion of cases on the same
topic in casebooks on different subjects facilitates and encourages unnecessary
duplication and, to that extent, unnecessarily crowds our already crowded three-
year course, is a fact that cannot be gainsaid. It is to be hoped that some agree-
ment may be reached as to where topics representing the points at which subjects
overlap, can best be taught and a plan adopted with reference to which compilers
will construct their casebooks in preference to referring to their own ideas.
This would make any casebook constructed after ihe plan available for a wider
use and would also allow our present standard course to cover more ground in
the same length of time. It is believed that duplication equivalent at least to
two hours of work a 'week for a year exists pretty generally in the three-year
course as at present taught. Since it seems to be the concensus of opinion that
it is unwise at present to lengthen the course required for the undergraduate law
degree, an effort to devise some means, even if merely mechanical, whereby we
may turn to better account the three years at present available seems to be
necessary.
H. W. ARANT
Yale University, School of Law.
The Danube. Its Historical, Political and Economic Importance. By Dr. Henry
Hainal. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, i920- pp. 167.
In his preface the author quotes Sir Charles Dilke, "that there were many
people who knew a little about the Danube, but that there was not a single one
who knew the subject thoroughly." The reviewer fears that this volume will
not provide European statesmen who are to draw the new convention for the
regulation of traffic on the Danube with the required thorough knowledge.
As a preparation to his study of the Danube the author, in thirty-eight pages,
reviews International Law with regard to rivers up to the Congress of Vienna,
then devotes fifteen pages to the Congress and its results and .fifty pages to the
subsequent history of the Danube from the point of view of International Law.
The remainder of the book treats of commerce and navigation on the Danube.
It is manifestly impossible to do more than sketch the outlines of fluvial legal
history in so few pages, and the author has not been very successful in the diffi-
cult art of selection and condensation of materiaL His work would have been
better balanced had he given references for the treaty provisions which he
prints at length and devoted the space thus saved to a fuller description of river
conditions prior to the Convention of i803, and to any description at all of the
Rhine courts, so important from an international poirit of view.
The author is not always accurate in his expressions. The Treaty of Osna-
burck was rather aimed at the illegal tolls which had been imposed on river com-
merce during the Thirty Years' War than intended to secure "commercial and
economic freedom" (page 18); and the Treaty of 'Munster was certainly not
designed to "alleviate the disastrous state. of navigation on the . . . Scheldt"
(page i8), but as the author himself shows in another place, to stop the important
navigation on this stream; nor did the Treaty of Ryswik make "provision for
free navigation" of the Rhine, but only for reciprocal freedom between certain
riparian states with the prohibition of an increase in existing tolls. The true
nature of the struggle for river freedom up to the Convention of z803 was to
free commerce from arbitrary exactions of riparian princes and cities, and to
reform the existing limitations rather than to secure the free use of the streams
even to riparians and much less to non-riparians.
Dr. Hajnal says in his Preface that the part of his book referring to the
Danube since the Treaty of Paris is an "outline," but this does not justify his
devoting over five pages to the abortive riparian commission of 1856 in contrast
to six pages to the European Commission, and only one-half page to the import-
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ant projected riparian commission of 1883 and the regulation then proposed.
He does not refer to the part played by the Danube in the Russo-Turk War of
1876, or to the Treaty of San Stefano, and merely mentions the Treaty of Berlin.
He does not continue his narrative through the World War.
The most valuable part of the book is that referring to the Austrian Steam
Navigation Company and the extracts from various Austrian documents, and
from books not easily obtainable in the United States. The author promises a
detailed statement of the Danube history from i856 to the present date. At
present the Austrian Government has opened its archives freely, so that it is to
be hoped that he will have an opportunity to continue his work in Vienna, where
no doubt much important information respecting Austrian policy as now
available.
The work would 'have been more valuable if the author had always cited his
authorities. This is especially the case in respect to the Austrian documents
used (pp. 57, 70, 71, 72). German books should always have been referred to by
their German titles, not.by English translations of those titles (pp. 76, io7), but
there is'no objection to annexing a translation, as is done in a note on page 130.
J. P. CHAMBERLAIN
Columbia University.
Prices and Price Control in Great Britain and the United States during the War.
By Simon Litman. Preliminary Economic Studies of the War by the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. New York, Oxford University Press,
1920. pp. X, 331.
Mr. Litman's volume is divided into two parts, the first dealing with Great
Britain, and the second with the United States. The familiarity of the reviewer
with price control in the former country is not sufficient to permit him to make
a detailed criticism of this particular portion of the volume. It is to be hoped,
however, that it leaves less to be desired than does that part dealing with the
United States. Mr. Litman is perhaps unfortunate in publishing his work some
time after the appearance of the Garrett study of price control in the United
States, made for the War Industries Board. That portion of Mr. Litman's
volume dealing with the United States largely duplicates the Garrett work, and
is very far from possessing the superiority of treatment which often may be
said to justify duplication. The Garrett study is much more thorough, compre-
hensive, and scientific than is that of Mr. Litman. In part, perhaps, this is due
to the brevity of the Litman study. He employs less than i5o pages to cover
price control in the United States, as against over 4oo with copious foot-notes by
Garrett. The Garrett study, moreover, contains in fine print a huge appendix of
regulations with annotations, and gives a view of price control infinitely superior
to that of Mr. Litman.
Through lack of a thorough and comprehensive examination of various regula-
tory measures Mr. Litman's study often discusses specific regulations governing
certain commodities with a complete omission of either mention or discussion
of rules governing the same commodities of either equal or greater importance.
This necessarily results in an incomplete and superficial picture of regulation,
and also misleads the reader-into the belief that the discussion in question covers
all the regulatory measures, when, as a matter of fact this is not the case. It is
exceedingly regrettable that a supposedly scientific treatment of prices and price
control should be issued which is so superficial that it omits completely, not only
discussion of, but even reference to, a very large portion of the price regulations
dealing with various commodities. It is the more regrettable from the fact that
the volume appears through the Carnegie Foundation. One is led to wonder
whether the other economic studies of the war made, or being made, by this
organization are as defective as the one under review.
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Certain further comments the reviewer feels compelled to make. He has little
or no sympathy with a study of price control based almost entirely on secondary
sources nor with the enployment of popular articles in the Literary Digest,
Country Gentleman, The Forum, and the New Republic as authorities. The
author's large and at times exclusive employment of secondary iources for
information tends to emphasize his failure to examine more than superficially
the available source of material. For instance, there is practically no reference
to any Food Administration regulation, except through secondary sources,
although these regulations would make a volume twice as large as Mr. Litman's.
The whole study, at least so far as the United States is concerned, is so incom-
plefe and unscientific that the reader necessarily will obtain a misleading and
inaccurate idea of price control in the United States.
W. H. S. STExwNs.
Washington, D. C.
Uniform State Laws in the United States, Annotated. By Charles Thaddeus
Terry. New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co., i92o. pp. xi, 688.
This book is published under the auspices anc for the purposes of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The twenty-three uni-
form statutes drafted and recommended by the commissioners before i9ig are
arranged in chronological order beginning with the Uniform Acknowledgments of
Written Instruments Act of 1892 and ending with the Uniform Fraudulent Con-
veyance Act of i918. To each act is prefixed a list of the states which have
adopted it. The book is thus a record of the achievement of the commissioners.
But it is a semi-official record. Its semi-official character explains' the reticence
and perfunctoriness of the notes introducing each act. They contain only the
briefest and most formal statement of the histories of the acts. No reference
is made to the existing and almost indispensable tools for their study. For
instance there is no mention of the 1,300 pages of commentary on the Uniform
Sales Act by its draftsman, Professor Samuel Williston, and no reference to
the annotated edition of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law by its drafts-
man John J. Crawford, or to the invaluable edition by Professor J. D. Brannan.
The notes of the draftsmen originally appended to the sections of the acts are
not printed. In the case of the Sales Act, the Partnership Act, the Bills of
Lading Act, the Warehouse Receipts Act and the Stock Transfer Act, these
notes are of considerable value.
Its semi-official character also e'xplains the failure to distinguish" the important
from the unimportant, the useful from the useless, manifested in the rigid adher-
ence to the artificially symmetrical plan of treating in the same mode all the acts
from the Negotiable Instruments Law, which is in force in almosf every Amer-
ican jurisdiction, to the Uniform Flag Act of i917, which has not yet tempted
the keen but fastidious appetities of *the states for ceremorial patriotism. One
hundred and eighty-four pages, or nearly one-fourth, of the book is devoted to the
text of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and the citation of cases
decided under it. Even if the page after page of citations were arranged under
headings giving some indication of the points involved in the cases, the whole
would be a work of supererogation after Professor Brannan's edition. As it
stands, the enormous collection of cases is nearly useless. On the other hand,
the collection of the few cases decided under the Partnership Act, which are not
collected elsewhere, is useful, for the absence of guides is not-an inconvenience.
In the case of the Sales Act the collection of cases is needed, but the absence of
headings reduces it to a minimum of utility. 'But to the semi-official editor
whose authentic criterion of value must needs be official approval, each of the
acts by virtue of its recommendation by the commissioners is of equal rank and
importance with the others and is therefore justly entitled to the same treatment.
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In brief, as a compilation of the Uniform Acts the book is useful. For col-
lections of the decisions under the acts which have not yet found editors, it is
helpful. The lists of states which have adopted the acts are a convenience but
not wholly reliable. For instance, Texas, which enacted the Uniform Negoti-
able Instruments Law in ig (Tex. Acts igig, ch. 123), is coupled with Georgia
and Porto Rico as one of the jurisdictions which have not yet adopted it.
The Civil Code of Brazil. Translated from the official Portuguese text by
Joseph Wheless. St. Louis, The Thomas Law Book Co., i920. pp. xxxvi, 438.
The enactment of the Civil Code of Brazil, which, thanks to Mr. Wheless'
translation, is now accessible to us in English, is an event of more than ordinary
importance. It constitutes the successful culmination of the efforts, extending
over half a century, to reduce the chaotic state of the Brazilian Civil Law to a
definite and systematic form.
Now that both the Civil Code and the Commercial Code of Brazil have been
translated into English, the American business man is in a position to inform
himself more thoroughly than was formerly possible concerning the Brazilian
law that may govern a particular relation.
The first essential of a good translation is without doubt scrupulous accuracy.
This is particularly true of the translation of a Code. In this respect the.requisite
care has not always been observed. In a number of instances the translator has
omitted parts of the original text; for example, in Article 219, which allows the
annulment of a marriage on account of essential error in respect to the person
of the other spouse, subdivision -III allows such annulment in case of: "Ignor-
ance, prior to marriage, Qf an incurable physical defect or of some grave trouble
which may be transmitted by way of contagion or inheritance, and capable of
endangering the health of the other spouse and of his or her children." This
subdivision is omitted. Subdivision III of the translation is sub-section.IV in
the original. Again, in Article 233, relating to the rights of the husband as
head of the conjugal partnership, subdivision V is omitted which reads as
follows: "Provide for the maintenance of the family, with due regard to the
provisions contained in Article 277." From Article 496 the following is omitted:
"and the singular successor is privileged to join his possession to that of his
predecessor." In Article 1286 the first paragraph is omitted, which provides that
"A necessary deposit is not presumed to be gratuitous."
Barring omissions such as the above, the translation appears to be fairly
accurate. One or two serious mistakes have, however, been discovered. In
Article 1452 the Portuguese word "estorno," which refers to the rescission of
a contract, is translated as "average." The last part of the paragraph should
read, therefore: "the special provisions of the maritime law with respect, to
rescission of contracts will be observed."' Article 1534 provides in the original:
"When the debtor cannot perform in the mode stipulated, he shall substitute for
it its value in the money current at the place where the obligation is to be
performed." In the translation the last part of the article reads: "in the place
where the obligation is executed."
A good translation requires furthermore that the original text should be
reduced into idiomatic English. In the case of a legal work this means that so
far as possible the translation should be expressed in the legal terminology
familiar to English and American lawyers. In this respect the translation is
subject to serious criticism. In a large number of instanbes where it would have
been perfectly easy to give the English equivalent the Portuguese words have
'This mistake was corrected by the translator on the manuscript which was
originally sent to the printer but was lost in the mail. By some oversight the
correction was not made on the carbon copy from which the article was printed.
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been simply. anglicized. The following are typical: Art. 183 (II) "affines in
right line" (relations by affinity in direct line); Art. 265 "incommunicability"
(clause against community); Art. 293 (VI) "disappropriation" (taking of
property by eminent domain) ; Art. 486 "pignorative creditor" (pledgee) ; Art.
516, "voluptuary improvements" (for pleasure, not necessary or beneficial);
Art. 52o (II) "tradition" (delivery) ; Art. 52o, Single Paragraph: "to prescribe"
(to bar by the statute of limitations) ; Art 521 "regressive right" (right of
indemnity) ; p. 134, "finds" (finding); Art. 647, "resolved" (terminated); Art.
939, "acquittance" (receipt) ; p. 2.o6, "payment by consignation" (judicial
deposit); p. 21o, "dation in payment" (giving in payment); Art. 1o26, "trans-
action" (compromise) ; Art. io39, "compromise" (arbitration) ; Art. i1oi
"commutative contract" (reciprocal); Art. 1i49, "right of prelation" (prefer-
ence) ; Art. 1193, "locator" (lessor) ; p. 245, "location of estates" (lease) ;
p. 247, "location of services" (contract for services); Art. i589 "accretes"
(accrues); Art. i59i (I), "notoriously known" (publicly known).
At times the correct English equivalent is used in one paragraph and the
Anglicized version of the Portuguese in another. In these cases the foreign
terminology is merely an imperfection which does not seriously detract from the
merits of the translation. In many instances, however, the meaning of the
original text is obscured thereby to such a degree that a study of the context
or a familiarity with Roman law is necessary before it can be understood.
Another peculiarity, which is disturbing to the reader, is the frequent paren-
thetical insertion of Portuguese words and phrases of the simplest kind.
E. G. LORENZEN.
Yale University, School of Law.
Handbook of Admiralty Law. By Robert M. Hughes. Second Edition. St.
Paul,, West Publishing Co., i92o. pp. xviii, 572.
In the first edition Mr. Hughes succeeded in stating the elementary principles
of the Admiralty Law, as administered in this country, with clearness and brevity;
and in the second he has modernized the text and references without impairing the
practical usefulness of the book by over-expanding it. It is much easier to
compound a hash of all the cases on a given topic than to collect and state the
controlling principles of decision as Mr. Hughes has done. This gives to his
work a touch of personality and a note of authority not always found in modern
textbooks. The original classification and sub-division, which made it a most
convenient reference book, have been preserved, and the citation of authorities
is discriminating yet comprehensive. Changes in the original text, made neces-
sary by the progress of the law, may be noted.
Unfortunately, the Act of Congress of March 3o, i92o, giving a right of action
to the personal representative for death caused by wrongful act or neglect occur-
ring on the high seas, and providing that contributory negligence should not bar
the action, but that "the court shall take into consideration the degree of
negligence attributable to the decedent and reduce the recovery accordingly,"
came too late for comment in the text, though it is printed in the margin.
Congress might better have applied the recognized Admiralty rule of equal
division of damages in cases of mutual fault, but aside from that the Act
seems inadequate, because the right of action is given only when the fault or
neglect occurs on the high seas, as distinct from the navigable waters of the
United States. This leaves all cases where the right of action arises within the
three mile limit, subject to the defense of contributory negligence and to all
other limitations of the applicable local statute. It also leaves open the ques-
tion whether the act covers the case of an injury on the high seas followed
by death within the three mile limit. Is the act a survival act or a death act,
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and if the former, can any cause -of action for compensatory damages survive
to the representative except when the seaman, had he lived, would have had a
cause of action for compensatory damages under the rules formulated in The
Osceola (I9O3) I89 U. S. I58, 23 Sup. Ct. 483. One would like to have had Mr.
Hughes' comments on the~e questions.
Other new questions have arisen as to the rights of persons injured in mari-
time employment to claim compensation under local workmen's compensation
acts. Mr. Hughes suggests that since the Admiralty (until the Act of 1920)
gave no right of action to the representative of the deceased workmen for
injuries resulting in death, but simply enforced state statutes on that subject,
that substitution of a different remely by the state can hardly be called an
invasion of the exclusive Admiralty jurisdiction. But that loophole was closed'
by Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart (1920) 253 U. S. 149, 40 Sup. Ct. 438,
only referred to in the note. Perhaps it is still possible that a way may be
found to apply state compensation acts for the benefit of some workmen injured
upon navigable waters within the three mile limit. The only constitutional
objection upheld in the Knickerbocker Ice Co. Case was that the particular act
in question was a delegation of the legislative power of Congress, and that
objection may be avoided by inserting in another act a general definition of
compensation acts. The other objection, that against impairing the harmony
and unity of the maritime law, is a good constitutional objection against state
legislation having that effect. [Chelentis v. Luckenbach (I918) 247 U.-S. 572,
38 Sup. Ct. 5O.] But as applied to Acts of Congress it is merely an argument
ab inconvenienti, which is of considerable weight when applied, as in the Knicker-
bocker Ice Co. case, to the liability of a ship owner to a seaman injured in the
service of the ship, but of no practical importance when applied to cases where a
common-law remedy is already saved to the suitor at his option. In such cases
at least, it would seem that Congress, which has changed the maritime rules of
liability in many other respects, might constitutionally authorize a workman
injured on navigable waters to resort at his option to a local workmen's compen-
sation act, provided it complied with defined requirements.
In treating of the relative priority of maritime liens founded on contract, the
author still adheres to the theory that they are to be ranked according to their
relative merits. The older authorities fully support this theory, but in the
writer's opinion, the practical result of all discussion as to their supposed
relative merits is that the latest contract lien is the .most meritorious, because
the service out of which it arose may invariably be said to have enhanced the
value or availability of the res for the benefit of all prior lienors. The cases
in this country which reach a different result (except as to seamen's wages)
are almost negligible. In other words, the attempt to rank contract liens accord-
ing to their supposed merits simply leads to the right result by an erroneous
process of reasoning totally inapplicable to the marshalling of tort liens, or to
conflicts of priority between tort and contract liens. It is submitted that the true
principle applicable in all cases is that pointed out in The John G. Stevens (i898)
170 U. S. 113, i8 Sup. Ct. 544, that a maritime lien is a ins in re, which makes the
lienor a part owner in interest in the vessel from the time when his lien attaches.
And while the court did not in that opinion lay down any general rule, it follows
from the peculiar quality of the right that all maritime liens which in fact
arise out of successive transactions must be payable ifn the inverse order of
their attachment, unless an arbitrary exception is to be made in favor of sea-
men's wages, as the opinion suggests.
For its own sake the profession will regret that Mr. Hughes did not include
in this volume a study of recent development in the law of contraband and
prize.
JOHN KIMBERLy BEACH.
Yale University, School of Law.
